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I
ssues of labor supply are at the heart of macroeconomic studies of large
cyclicalﬂuctuations. Thepopulationputsforthmoreworkeffortinbooms
than in slumps. Economists’ explanations of this phenomenon range
from a pure market-clearing supply-and-demand view at one extreme to a
dismissal of almost any role of supply and of market clearing at the other
extreme. Disagreement is intense because labor markets’failure to clear may
create a strong case favoring activist macroeconomic policy. According to the
equilibrium business cycle models led by Lucas and Rapping (1969), people
work more hours in some years than in others because the market rewards
them for this pattern. Even in a non-equilibrium model in which the role of
labor supply is dismissed in the short run, its slope is still important for the
welfare cost of departing from the supply schedule. Labor supply elasticity is
also crucial in evaluating the effect of taxes and government spending (e.g.,
Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1987; Judd 1987).
Figure 1 shows the cyclical components of total hours worked and wages
fortheU.S.economyfor1964:I–2003:II(detrendedusingtheHodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter). Hours worked represent the total hours employed in the nonagricul-
tural business sector. The wages are real hourly earnings of the production
and nonsupervisory workers. Fluctuations of hours of work are much greater
than those of wages.1 If the intertemporal substitution hypothesis were to
explain ﬂuctuations in hours, it would require a labor supply elasticity beyond
We would like to thank Andreas Hornstein, Thomas Humphrey, Yash Mehra, and Pierre
Sarte for their helpful comments. The views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 Moreover, wages are not strongly correlated with hours, casting further doubt on the in-
tertemporal substitution mechanism. While the contemporaneous and dynamic correlations between
hours and wages are important for business cycle analysis, we focus on the slope of the labor
supply schedule only in this article. See Chang and Kim (2004b) on this issue.
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theadmissibleestimatesfromtheempiricalmicrostudies, whicharetypically
less than 0.5.2
In this article, we demonstrate both qualitatively and quantitatively how
the slope of the aggregate labor supply schedule is determined by the reser-
vation wage distribution, rather than by the willingness to substitute leisure
intertemporally.3 Basedonourrecentstudies(ChangandKim2004a,2004b),
we present a fully speciﬁed general equilibrium model economy where the
reservation wage distribution is nondegenerate. While the model is parsi-
monious, it provides a laboratory in which we can investigate the mapping
from individual to aggregate labor supply functions. The model economy is
populated by many workers who face uninsurable idiosyncratic productivity
shocks—as demonstrated in Aigagari’s (1994) incomplete capital market—
and make decisions on the labor market participation—as demonstrated by
Rogerson’s (1985) study of indivisible labor. The cross-sectional distribu-
tions of earnings and wealth are comparable to those in the U.S. data. We ﬁnd
that the aggregate labor supply elasticity of such an economy is around one,
eventhoughtheintertemporalsubstitutionelasticityofleisureattheindividual
level is assumed to be 0.4. This aggregate elasticity is greater than the typical
microestimatesbutsmallerthanthoseoftenassumedintheaggregatemodels.
The article is organized as follows: Section 1 provides various models
of aggregate labor supply based on individuals’ work decisions. Section 2
presentsillustrativeexamplesthatdemonstratehowtheaggregatelaborsupply
depends on the reservation wage distribution. Section 3 lays out the model
economy where the reservation wage distribution is dispersed. In Section 4,
wecalibratethemodelparametersusingvariousmicrodataandinvestigatethe
properties of aggregate labor supply of the model. Section 5 summarizes our
ﬁndings.
1. LABOR SUPPLY: INDIVIDUAL VERSUSAGGREGATE
In this section, we consider various models on individuals’ labor supply de-
cisions and derive the corresponding aggregate labor supply schedules. For
2 In his survey paper, Pencavel (1986) reports that most estimates are between 0.00 and 0.45
for men. In their parallel survey of research on the labor supply of women, Killingsworth and
Heckman (1986) present a wide range of estimates, from -0.3 to 14.0; they do not venture a guess
as to which is correct but conclude that the elasticity is probably somewhat higher for women
than men. See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a more recent review of the literature. An
alternative (equilibrium) approach is to introduce shifts in labor supply through shifts in prefer-
ence (Bencivenga 1992), home technology (Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright 1991; Greenwood and
Hercowitz 1991), or government spending (Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992).
3 Hansen’s (1985) indivisible labor economy, based on the theory of employment lotteries
by Rogerson (1988), generates a very high aggregate labor supply elasticity—in fact, inﬁnity—
regardless of individual labor supply elasticity. However, the existence of employment lotteries
is not strongly supported by the data, as the persons with greater hours or greater earnings per
hour consume more. Our analysis illustrates that such an economy is a special case where the
reservation wage distribution is degenerate.Y. Chang and S. Kim: On theAggregate Labor Supply 23
the moment, we abstract from the intertemporal decisions. Hence, models in
thissectionarestaticandofpartialequilibrium. Wewillstudyafullyspeciﬁed
dynamic general equilibrium model in Section 3.
HomogeneousAgents with Divisible Labor
Supposethereismeasureoneofidenticalagentswiththefollowingpreferences








c = wh+ ra, (2)
where w is the hourly wage; r, the interest rate; and a, asset holdings. The





The marginal disutility from additional hours of work equals the marginal







The Frisch elasticity—elasticity of hours with respect to wage holding
wealth (consumption) constant—is γ. With homogeneous agents, the aggre-
gatelaborsupplyelasticityisalsoγ. Accordingtotheempiricalmicrostudies,
the labor supply is inelastic since a typical value of γ is less than 0.5. As Fig-
ure 1 illustrates, inelastic labor supply is hard to reconcile with the fact that
hours ﬂuctuate greatly without much variation in wages.
HomogeneousAgents with Indivisible Labor
A large fraction of cyclical ﬂuctuations of total hours worked reﬂects the de-
cisions to work or not (the so-called extensive margin), whereas the micro
elasticities reﬂect the variation of hours for employed workers (intensive mar-
gin). Theindivisiblelabormodelhasbeendevelopedtohighlighttheextensive
margin of labor supply.4 Suppose an agent supplies ¯ h hours if he works and
zero hours otherwise. With homogeneous agents, the labor supply decision is
4 In general, the labor supply decision operates on both the extensive and intensive margins.
However, workers are rarely allowed to choose completely ﬂexible work schedules or to supply a
small number of hours.24 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 1 Cyclical Components of Total Hours and Wages










Notes: Hours worked represent the nonagricultural private sector. Wage is real hourly
earnings for nonsupervisory and production workers.
randomized (see Hansen 1985 and Rogerson 1988). An agent chooses prob-
ability of working, p, and the expected utility is p(lnc − B
¯ h1+1/γ
1+1/γ ) + (1 −
p)(lnc − 0). Then the agent’s maximization problem with the existence of a








c = wp ¯ h + ra.
The equilibrium value of p is equal to the fraction of agents that work, and
the aggregate labor supply is given by H = p¯ h. The aggregate labor supply
elasticity is inﬁnite, as the stand-in agent’s utility is linear in p. While the
aggregate labor supply is inﬁnitely elastic in this environment, the under-
lying assumptions—homogeneity and complete market—are vulnerable even
to casual empiricism.Y. Chang and S. Kim: On theAggregate Labor Supply 25
HeterogeneousAgents with Indivisible Labor
Suppose workers differ in both preference (B) and asset holdings (a) and that
the complete insurance of idiosyncratic risks is not available. With indivisible
labor, the agent, i, works if









exp(Bi ) − 1

, (6)
where   =
¯ h1+1/γ
1+1/γ is a constant, independent of individual characteristics.
Workers with high Bi (those who value leisure more relative to commodity
consumption) exhibit a higher reservation wage. The richer (ai) a worker
is, the higher his reservation wage. In general the reservation wage depends
on various dimensions of cross-sectional heterogeneity. In Section 3, we
investigate the fully speciﬁed dynamic general equilibrium model where the
shape of  ( w)is parsimoniously characterized by the microdata and depends
on the agent’s earnings ability as well as wealth.
2. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
Before we present our formal analysis, we provide the examples that illustrate
the dependence of aggregate labor supply on the shape of reservation wage
distribution. Suppose that equal numbers of two types of workers exist in
the economy, with reservation wages of $10 and $20, respectively. Suppose
also that labor supply is indivisible in the sense that a worker supplies one
unit of labor if he works. Figure 2 shows that the aggregate labor supply—
the horizontal sum of individual labor supply—can have two elasticities. At
a wage rate of $10 and $20, the elasticity is inﬁnity. Otherwise, it is zero.
Whenever a mass in the reservation wage distribution exists, the aggregate
labor supply elasticity can take a large value. Suppose that many types of
workers exist and that a worker works ¯ h hours if the market wage, w, exceeds
the reservation wage,  w:
h(w) =

¯ h if w ≥  w,
0 otherwise.




¯ hφ( w)d w =  (w)¯ h.26 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 2 Individual andAggregate Labor Supply
Type 1 Type 2 Aggregate Employment Rate (%)































The aggregate elasticity depends on the concentration of workers—the
marginal density,   (w), relative to the cumulative density,  (w). In the
two-type workforce example, the aggregate elasticity is inﬁnity where there
is a mass of workers, (  (10) =   (20) =∞ ), and zero elsewhere. In the
lotteryeconomyofHansen(1985)andRogerson(1988), thereservationwage
distribution is degenerate (as the agents are identical) at the equilibrium wage
rate (  (w) =∞ ), and the aggregate elasticity becomes inﬁnity.
The aggregate elasticity depends on the relative concentration of workers
evenwhenworkersareallowedtoworklongerhoursathigherwages. Suppose
the labor supply of a worker is
h(w;  w) =

¯ h + ˆ h(w;  w) if w ≥  w,
0 otherwise.Y. Chang and S. Kim: On theAggregate Labor Supply 27
Here ˆ h(w;  w) is hours worked beyond the minimum hours, ¯ h, and satisﬁes
ˆ h(w;  w) ≥ 0 with equality when w =  w and ˆ h (w;  w) > 0.5 The aggregate




h(w;  w)φ( w)d w = ¯ h (w) +
 w
0
ˆ h(w;  w)φ( w)d w,
where the total hours worked consists of the sum of the extensive margins,
¯ h (w), and that of intensive margins,
 w
0 ˆ h(w;  w)φ( w)d w. Given that
H (w) = h(w;w)φ(w)+
 w
0
h (w;  w)φ( w)d w,




0 h (w;  w)φ( w)d w]w
 w
0 h(w;  w)φ( w)d w
.
For illustrative purposes, suppose the individual labor supply elasticity, γ,i s
constant across workers and wages: γ =
h (w;  w)w
h(w;  w)
. Substituting h (w;  w)
with γ, the aggregate elasticity can be again expressed as the sum of the
relative concentration of reservation wages and the individual elasticity:
 (w) =
¯ h  (w)w
¯ h (w) +
 w
0 ˆ h(w;  w)φ( w)d w
+ γ.
Theseexamplesillustratetwoimportantaspectsofaggregatelaborsupply:
the aggregate elasticity can be different from that of microelasticity and the
aggregate labor supply elasticity is not time-invariant because the reservation
wage distribution evolves over time as the wealth distribution and the level of
employment change over time. However, these examples are silent about the
magnitude of the aggregate labor supply elasticity for which the exact shape
of the empirical reservation wage distribution must be uncovered. In the next
section,wepresentamodeleconomy—asimpliﬁedversionofChangandKim
(2004a)—where the reservation wage distribution,  ( w), is determined by
the asset accumulation of households that face different types of uninsurable
income risks.6 While the model is parsimonious, it allows for a complete
characterization of the reservation wage distribution.
3. A FULLY SPECIFIED GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
There is a continuum (measure one) of workers who have identical prefer-
ences but different productivity. Individual productivity varies exogenously
5 The minimum-hours restriction can be easily justiﬁed, for example, by ﬁxed costs, such as
commuting time.
6 In Chang and Kim (2004a), the economy consists of many households made up of a hus-
band and wife. Here we present a model that is populated by many single-agent households.28 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
according to a stochastic process with a transition probability distribution
function, πx(x |x) = Pr(x t+1 ≤ x |xt = x). A worker maximizes his utility


















at+1 = wtxtht + (1 + rt)at − ct. (7)
Workers trade claims for physical capital, at, which yields the rate of
return, rt, and depreciates at the rate, δ. The capital market is incomplete.
Physical capital is the only asset available to workers who face a borrowing
constraint, at ≥¯ a for all t. We abstract from the intensive margin and assume
that the labor supply is indivisible. If employed, a worker supplies ¯ h units of
labor and earns wtxt ¯ h, where wt is wage rate per effective unit of labor.
The representative ﬁrm produces output according to a Cobb-Douglas
technology in capital, Kt, and efﬁciency units of labor, Lt:7
Yt = F(L t,K t,λ t) = λtLα
t K1−α
t ,
where λt is the aggregate productivity shock with a transition probability
distribution function, πλ(λ |λ) = Pr(λ t+1 ≤ λ |λt = λ).8
The value function for an employed worker, denoted by V E,i s











V E(a ,x ;λ ,µ  ),








c = wx¯ h + (1 + r)a− a ,
7 This production function implicitly assumes that workers are perfect substitutes for each
other. While this assumption abstracts from reality, it greatly simpliﬁes the labor market equilib-
rium.
8 In this model economy, the technology shock is the only aggregate shock. This restriction
does not necessarily reﬂect our view on the source of the business cycles. As we would like to
show that the preference residual contains a signiﬁcant speciﬁcation error rather than true shifts in
preferences, we intentionally exclude shocks that may shift the labor supply schedule itself (e.g.,
shifts in government spending or changes in the income tax rate) from the present article.Y. Chang and S. Kim: On theAggregate Labor Supply 29
a  ≥¯ a, and
µ  = T(λ,µ),
where T denotes a transition operator that deﬁnes the law of motion for the
distribution of workers, µ(a,x).9 The value function for a nonemployed
worker, denoted by V N(a,x;λ,µ), is deﬁned similarly with h = 0. Then,







Equilibrium consists of a set of value functions, {V E(a,x;λ,µ), V N
(a,x;λ,µ), V(a,x;λ,µ)}; a set of decision rules for consumption,
asset holdings, and labor supply, {c(a,x;λ,µ), a (a,x;λ,µ), h(a,x;λ,µ)};
aggregate inputs, {K(λ,µ), L(λ,µ)}; factor prices, {w(λ,µ), r(λ,µ)}; and a
law of motion for the distribution µ  = T(λ,µ) such that:
1. Individuals optimize:
Givenw(λ,µ)andr(λ,µ),theindividualdecisionrules—c(a,x;λ,µ),
a (a,x;λ,µ),andh(a,x;λ,µ)—solveV E(a,x;λ,µ),V N(a,x;λ,µ),
and V(a,x;λ,µ).












3. The goods market clears:
 
















9 Let A and X denote sets of all possible realizations of a and x, respectively. The measure
µ(a,x) is deﬁned over a σ-algebra of A × X.30 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Parameters of the Benchmark Model Economy
Parameter Description
α = 0.64 Labor share in production function
β = 0.9785504 Discount factor
γ = 0.4 Individual labor supply elasticity with divisible labor
B = 151.28 Utility parameter
h = 1/3 Labor supply if working
¯ a =− 2.0 Borrowing constraint
ρx = 0.939 Persistence of idiosyncratic productivity shock
σx = 0.287 Standard deviation of innovation to idiosyncratic productivity
ρλ = 0.95 Persistence of aggregate productivity shock
σλ = 0.007 Standard deviation of innovation to aggregate productivity
for all (λ,µ).






1a =a (a,x;λ,µ) dπx(x |x)dµ
	
da dx 
for all A0 ⊂ A and X0 ⊂ X.
4. QUANTITATIVEANALYSIS
Calibration
We brieﬂy explain the choice of the model parameters. The unit of time is a
businessquarter. Weassumethatx followsanAR(1)process: lnx  = ρxlnx+
εx, where εx ∼ N(0,σ2
x). As we view x as reﬂecting a broad measure of
earningsabilityinthemarket,weestimatethestochasticprocessofx basedon
the wages from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for 1979–1992.
Thevaluesofρx = 0.939andσx = 0.287reﬂectthepersistenceandstandard
deviation of innovations to individual wages.10 The other parameters of the
article are in accordance with the business cycle analysis and empirical labor
supply literature. A working individual spends one-third of her discretionary
time: ¯ h = 1/3. The individual compensated labor supply elasticity of hours,
γ, is 0.4. The labor share of output, α, is 0.64, and the depreciation rate,
δ, is 2.5 percent. We search for the weight parameter on leisure, B, such
10 These are maximum-likelihood estimates of Heckman (1979), correcting for a sample selec-
tion bias. Our estimate for income shocks does not purge the life-cycle effect. In our companion
paper, Chang and Kim (2004a), we use both cases. When the life-cycle effect (accounted for by
observed characteristics such as age, education, and sex) is purged, the aggregate labor supply
elasticity becomes slightly bigger because the reservation wage distribution becomes less dispersed.Y. Chang and S. Kim: On theAggregate Labor Supply 31
Table 2 Characteristics of Wealth Distribution
Quintile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Total
PSID
Share of wealth -0.52 0.50 5.06 18.74 76.22 100
Group average/population average -0.02 0.03 0.25 0.93 3.81 1
Share of earnings -7.51 11.31 18.72 24.21 38.23 100
Model
Share of wealth -2.05 2.46 10.22 23.88 65.49 100
Group average/population average -0.10 0.12 0.51 1.19 3.27 1
Share of earnings 9.70 15.06 19.01 23.59 32.63 100
Notes: The PSID statistics reﬂect the family wealth and earnings levels published in their
1984 survey.
that the steady state employment rate is 60 percent, the current population
survey average for 1967:II–2000:IV. The discount factor, β, is chosen so that
the quarterly rate of return to capital is 1 percent. The aggregate productivity
shock,λt,followsanAR(1)process: lnλ  = ρλlnλ+ελ,whereελ ∼ N(0,σ2
λ).
Wesetρλ equalto0.95andσλ equalto0.007, followingKydlandandPrescott
(1982). Table 1 summarizes the parameter values of the benchmark economy.
Cross-Sectional Earnings and Wealth Distribution
As we investigate the aggregation issue, it is desirable for the model economy
to possess a reasonable amount of heterogeneity. We compare cross-sectional
earnings and wealth—two important observable dimensions of heterogeneity
in the labor market—found in the model and in the data.
Table 2 summarizes both the PSID and the model’s detailed information
on wealth and earnings. Family wealth in the PSID (1984 survey) reﬂects the
net worth of houses, other real estate, vehicles, farms and businesses owned,
stocks, bonds, cash accounts, and other assets. For each quintile group of
wealth distribution, we calculate the wealth share, ratio of group average to
economy-wide average, and the earnings share.
In both the data and the model, the poorest 20 percent of families in
terms of wealth distribution were found to own virtually nothing. In fact,
households in the ﬁrst quintile of wealth distribution were found to be in debt
in both the model and the data. The PSID found that households in the fourth
and ﬁfth quintile own 18.74 and 76.22 percent of total wealth, respectively,
while,accordingtothemodel,theyown23.88and65.49percent,respectively.
The average wealth of those in the fourth and ﬁfth quintile is, respectively,
0.93 and 3.81 times larger than that of a typical household, according to the32 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 3 Reservation Wage Schedule



















A: All Asset Levels





































Notes: The graphs denote the reservation wage schedule of the benchmark model. Wages
(quarterly earnings) and assets are in 1983 dollars.
PSID. These ratios are 1.19 and 3.27 according to our model. The fourth and
ﬁfth quintile groups of the wealth distribution earn, respectively, 24.21 and
38.23 percent of total earnings, according to the PSID. The corresponding
groups earn 23.59 and 32.63 percent, respectively, in the model.
Overall, the wealth distribution is found to be more skewed in the data.
In particular, our model fails to match the highly concentrated wealth found
in the right tail of the distribution. In the PSID, the top 5 percent of the
populationcontrolsabouthalfoftotalwealth(notshowninTable2), whereas,
in our model, they possess only 20 percent of total wealth. Since our primary
objective is not to explain the top 1 to 5 percent of the population, we argue
thatthemodeleconomypresentedinthisarticlepossessesareasonabledegree
of heterogeneity, thus making it possible to study the effects of aggregation in
the labor market.
Reservation Wage Distribution
The reservation wage distribution is crucial for the mapping from individual
to aggregate labor supply. In Figure 3, we plot the reservation wage scheduleY. Chang and S. Kim: On theAggregate Labor Supply 33
Figure 4 Reservation Wages and Participation Rates



























Notes: The graph denotes the inverse cumulative distribution functions of reservation
wages. Wages are quarterly earnings in 1983 dollars.
of the benchmark model for all asset levels (panel A) and for assets less than
$200,000 (panel B).At a given asset level, workers with wages (productivity)
above the line choose to work. The reservation wage increases as the asset
level increases. To illustrate, we adjust the units so that the mean asset of the
model matches the average asset in the 1984 PSID survey, $60,524; thus, the
values are in 1983 dollars.11 Consider a worker whose assets are $29,880, the
median of the wealth distribution from the model. According to the model,
he is indifferent between working and not working at quarterly earnings of
$3,287. Another worker whose assets are equivalent to the average asset
holding of the economy, $60,524 (which belongs to the 66th percentile of the
wealth distribution in our model and to the 72nd percentile in the PSID), is
indifferent about working at $4,273 per quarter.
In Figure 4 we plot the inverse cumulative distribution of reservation
wages of the model. In practice, the reservation wage distribution is neither
observed nor constant over time. Based on the reservation wage schedule and
11 The mean asset in our model is 14.48 units. The reservation wages in the vertical axis
reﬂect quarterly earnings (the reservation wage rate multiplied by ¯ h).34 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 5 Total Hours Worked from the Models










invariant distribution, µ(x,a), we can infer the responsiveness of labor mar-
ket participation. In Table 3 we compute the elasticities of participation with
respect to the reservation wage around the steady state. These values may be
viewed as the aggregate labor supply elasticity with zero wealth effect as they
assumetheentirewealthdistributionheldisconstant. Forthemodeleconomy,
the elasticities are 1.12, 1.05, and 0.97, respectively, at the employment rates
of 58, 60, and 62 percent. Overall, these values are bigger than typical micro
estimates, but they remain in a moderate range. In particular, a very high
elasticity—in fact, inﬁnity—generated by a lottery economy with a homoge-
neous workforce (in which the reservation wage distribution is degenerate)
does not survive serious heterogeneity.
Finally,wewouldliketoemphasizethat,whenlaborsupplyisindivisible,
the slope of the aggregate labor supply schedule is mostly determined by the
distribution of reservation wages rather than by the willingness to substitute
leisureintertemporally. Infact, theaggregatelaborsupplyisindependentofγ
in our economy. With a binary choice of hours, utility of market participants
and non-participants differs by a constant term, B
¯ h1+1/γ
1+1/γ [Recall (6)]. Given
γ, we adjust B (the weight parameter on disutility from working) to match
the 60 percent employment rate in the steady state, leaving the above constantY. Chang and S. Kim: On theAggregate Labor Supply 35
Table 3 Labor Supply Elasticity Implied by the Reservation Wage
Distribution
Employment Rate
E = 58% E = 60% E = 62%
1.12 1.05 0.97
Notes: The numbers reﬂect the elasticity of the labor market participation rate with re-
spect to reservation wage (evaluated at employment rates of 58, 60, and 62 percent) based
on the reservation wage distribution in the steady state.
term unchanged. As a result, the steady state reservation-wage distribution
remains the same regardless of γ.
Comparison with the RepresentativeAgent Model
We compare the volatility of hours from our model economy to that of
the representative agent economy. Both model economies will be subject to
identical stochastic aggregate productivity shocks that resemble that of the
post-war total factor productivity (Solow residual).
The value function of the representative agent, V R(K,λ),i s

















K  = F(K,H,z)+ (1 − δ)K − C.
Except for β,the same parameter values are used, β = 0.99.12 Fluctuation of
the heterogeneous agent model is solved by the method developed by Krusell
and Smith (1998). Figure 5 shows the sample paths of total hours worked
(percentage deviations from the steady states), respectively, from the hetero-
geneous agent economy and the representative agent economy, γ = 0.4. In
the face of aggregate productivity shocks whose stochastic process resembles
that of the post-war total factor productivity, hours of work from the hetero-
geneous agent economy exhibit a much greater volatility than those of the
representative agent model.
12 B is a free parameter in a sense that it does not affect the dynamics around the steady
state.36 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
5. SUMMARY
Wedemonstratethat,attheaggregatelevel,thelaborsupplyelasticitycansig-
niﬁcantly depart from the microelasticity. In an economy where households
make decisions on labor market participation, the slope of the aggregate labor
supplycurveisdeterminedbythedistributionofreservationwagesratherthan
by the willingness to substitute leisure intertemporally. We present a model
economy where households face uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks.
While the model is parsimonious, the cross-sectional distributions of earnings
and wealth are comparable to those in the U.S. data. We ﬁnd that the aggre-
gate labor supply elasticity of such an economy is around 1.0—despite the
low intertemporal substitution elasticity of leisure, assumed to be 0.4. The
equilibrium approach of business cycle analysis has been criticized on the
grounds that it requires an elasticity higher than the intertemporal substitution
elasticity estimated from the microdata. Our analysis shows that, while the
aggregate labor elasticity can depart from a microelasticity, it remains in a
moderate range as the reservation wage distribution is dispersed.
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